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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
HEALTH TECHNOLOGY PROJECT - Ln. No. 3330-KO
Preface
This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Health Technology Project
in Korea, for which Ln. No. 3330-KO in the amount of US$60 million equivalent was approved on
May 23, 1991 and made effective on October 16, 1991.
The Health Technology Project was closed on December 31, 1994. Final disbursement
took place on April 20th, 1995, at which time a balance of US$2.95 million was canceled.
The ICR was prepared by Ms. Sue Szabo of the Human Resources Operations
Division of the East Asia and Pacific Region, Country Department I, and reviewed by Mr. Mohammad
Farhandi, Acting Project Advisor, Country Department I, East Asia and Pacific Region. The borrower
provided comments that are included in Appendix B.
Preparation of this ICR was begun during the Bank's final supervision/completion
mission in December 1994. It is based on material in the project file, interviews with Bank staff and
consultants involved in the preparation and supervision of the project, interviews with MOHSA staff,
and site visitso project hospitals in Korea. The borrower contributed to preparation of the ICR by
sending their comments and evaluation on June 9, 1995.
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EVALUATION SUMMARY
Introduction.
1. In the late 1980s, the Bank was preparing to reduce its operations in the Republic of
Korea anticipating an expected graduation of Korea from Bank lending. The Bank's strategy
acknowledged that in the phase-out period, the Government of Korea (GOK) was interested in
borrowing for projects which carried with them transfer of technical or analytical expertise, or
would fill gaps in technology advancement or research and development programs. Moreover, the
social sectors had received less attention, and represented areas where Korea's knowledge and
experience lagged behind its general level of development.
2. Prior to the Health Technology Project, the Bank's only other project in the health sector
was the Population Project (Ln. 1774-5 KO). This was approved in December 1979 and closed in
December 1987, 31/2 years behind schedule. The Bank's sectoral knowledge was updated by a
health sector report, with special emphasis on insurance (Report No. 7412-KO, June 1989).
Project Objectives.
3. The objectives of the project were: (i) to support the regionalization of service delivery by
strengthening technology in key institutions in each of Korea's eight medical regions; (ii) to improve
access to modem medical technologies through a better geographic distribution of biomedical
equipment; (iii) to improve the efficiency of equipment selection and purchase through a more
rational population-based allocation process; and (iv) to strengthen the capability of the Ministry of
Health and Social Affairs (MOHSA) to manage the process of allocation and diffusion of medical
technologies and to monitor the financial performance of the hospitals selected. The project also
allowed the Bank to continue its policy dialogue with the Government of Korea, and to support
institutional development of MOHSA, which had overall responsibility for the project.
4. The project concept was consistent with both Bank country strategy and the specific
requests of the Korean authorities. Rapid growth, industrialization, and urbanization had changed
Korea's mortality profile and shifted the disease burden to largely noncommunicable diseases. The
modality of on-lending to private hospitals was also appropriate, responding both to the largely
private sector delivery of health services in Korea, and to the interest in the Bank in supporting
private sector development.
Implementation Results.
5. The Guidelines for Allocation of Loan Proceeds between components were modified, by
agreement of both the Bank and the Borrower. Actual disbursements are given in Table 5.
6. Approximately 4.9 percent of the loan (US$2.95 million) was cancelled. This is a very
small percentage, given: (a) the difficulties of forecasting the exact amount of on-lending to
individual hospitals in a demand-driven project, and (b) procurement by the Office of Supply,
Republic of Korea (OSROK) resulted in cost savings estimated at about 10%, hence reducing the
estimated initial cost to each individual hospital.
7. Overall, implementation performance was highly satisfactory and the project procured and
distributed biomedical equipment to a total of 81 hospitals. While implementation was somewhat
slow initially, this was partly due to factors beyond the control of MOHSA and not unreasonable
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given the demand-driven nature of the project. Both the Bank and the borrower showed flexibility
during the implementation process, allowing later progress to be deseribed as "significant and
satisfactory"
Summary of Findings, Future Operations, and Key Lessons Learned.
8. Project outcome is satisfactory and its achievements sustainable. The project was
innovative in that it involved MOHSA on-lending to private hospitals at a non-subsidized rate, and
that a negative list of equipment to some extent responded to equity concerns.
9. The project was largely an equipment procurement operation focused on priority needs,
with institutional strengthening of the Medical Management Division (MMD) and the Medical
Devices Division (MDD). The project achieved its stated objectives: (a) it supported the regional
distribution of medical technologies in the eight medical regions; (b) the project was successful in
procuring and distributing equipment to 81 hospitals maintaining a geographical balance according
to regional population density; and (c) equipment was selected using an Equipment Selection
Committee and was purchased through the central OSROK yielding better prices. In addition, the
project opened the way for a successor project which addressed health sector policy issues in health
care financing and cost containment.
10. The project had a straightforward design and was implemented satisfactorily. Thus there
are no major lessons to be learned. However, several observations are pertinent:
(a) The procurement of equipment under ICB procedures by an efficient procurement
agency (OSROK) resulted in savings of about 10% in total equipment costs.
(b) The training component, while small, was not implemented. This did not affect
the outcome of the project but greater effort should have been made to ensure that
the component was actually implemented.
(c) Lending to hospitals, rather than grant financing or outright donation of
equipment, may carry a greater incentive for hospitals to ensure proper
maintenance of equipment.
..
A. Project Objectives
Agreed Objectives
1. The objectives of the project were: (i) to support the regionalization of service delivery
and the referral system by strengthening the technology in key institutions in each of Korea's eight
medical regions; (ii) to improve access to modem medical technologies through a better geographic
distribution of biomedical equipment; (iii) to improve the efficiency of equipment selection and
purchase through a more rational population-based allocation process; and (iv) to strengthen the
capability of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MOHSA) to manage the process of
allocation and diffusion of medical technologies and to monitor the financial performance of the
hospitals selected, thereby setting an example for improved financial management of hospitals in
the private sector.
2. The project also allowed the Bank to continue its policy dialogue with the Government of
Korea (GOK), and to support institutional development of MOHSA, which had overall
responsibility for the project.
3. The project had three components: (a) Non-communicable disease (NCD) specialty units in
large referral hospitals; (b) Secondary care hospitals; and (c) Emergency medical services. In each
of these components, biomedical equipment was to be added and replaced, thereby achieving
project objectives. Beneficiary hospitals were to finance complementary inputs for civil works to
house the equipment, installation costs, maintenance and consumables related to the equipment,
training of operators and technicians, and contingencies. Project cost was estimated at US$81.2
million, to be financed by a Bank loan of US$60 million and local financing, by participating
hospitals, of US$21.2 million.'
Evaluation of Objectives.
4. Rapid growth had shifted Korea from a typical developing country health profile of high
fertility/high mortality and prevalence of infectious and parasitic diseases, to a developed country
profile of noncommunicable chronic and degenerative diseases. The project responded to a need
for the Korean health sector to adapt to these changes in an equitable manner. This overall concept
was sound. Discussions for the project had begun in December 1989 (see Table 3 for complete
timetable). Korean authorities had approached the Bank for assistance in meeting the increasing
demand by health professionals and patients for greater technological sophistication in the
provision of medical care
5 . The overall concept was also consistent with Bank country strategy. At the time (1989),
the Bank was preparing for Korea's graduation from Bank lending. Korea was the only newly
industrializing country in East Asia where the Bank remained active. Bank staff would be given
the opportunity to help adapt and apply developed country experience, and lessons could later be
employed in other borrowing countries. The Bank's strategy also acknowledged that the GOK was
interested in borrowing for projects which carried with them transfer of technical or analytical
expertise, or would fill gaps in technology advancement or research and development programs.
The social sectors had received less attention, and represented areas where Korea's knowledge and
experience lagged behind its general level of development. Moreover, the GOK showed
'Appraisal estimates, including contingencies, are given in Tables 6A and 6B.
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commitment o develop the health sector and had previously borrowed form OECF, IBRD, ADB
and KfW for hospital improvement.
6. Support to the private sector, by placing investments in selected non-profit private (NPP)
hospitals, was appropriate, given that:
(a) health care services are mostly delivered by the private sector. In 1989, private
clinics and hospitals employed 72% of physicians and 55% of nurses, managed
80% of hospital beds, and accounted for 73% of total health sector expenditures.
Not-for-profit hospitals accounted for about 60% of the beds, with average size of
240 beds;
(b) the on-lending design had been successful in a previous project. A revision in the
original design of the Korea Population Project (Ln. 1774-5 KO) had resulted in
part of project funds being on-lent to private non-profit hospitals. The PCR (No.
8114, April 1989) rated project performance satisfactory, and the PPAR (No.
8895, June 1990) commented favorably on the project redesign;
(c) preparation studies examined the equipment leasing market and commercial bank
market, and determined that there was insufficient capacity and/or unwillingness to
provide their services to the hospital sector;
(d) although concerned to promote greater equity, in 1989 the GOK was facing
increasing financial pressures from the appreciation of the won, and expanding
budgetary outlays for accelerated social sector programs;
(e) the Bank loan was to finance investment costs, with operational costs left to
private hospitals; and
(f) within the Bank, there was increasing focus on the support of private sector
development, and in this regard the project was innovative because of its
concentration on the private health sector.
B. Implementation Experience and Results
Implementation Record and Major Factors Affecting the Project
7. Overall, implementation performance was highly satisfactory. The loan agreement became
effective October 16, 1991. Beneficiary hospitals and their proposed equipment were selected by
independent review committees. The Hospital Selection Committee and Equipment Selection
Committee had been established and their respective members appointed, satisfactory to the Bank,
by the time of Board presentation. Agreements were reached during negotiations as to the criteria
to be used for selection of hospitals and for equipment (Annexes 9 and 12 of the SAR).
Participating hospitals were to take on the full conditions of the Bank loan, including the foreign
exchange risk, by signing sub-loan agreements with MOHSA. MOHSA had sent invitations to
apply for sub-loans to all private hospitals in January 1991, and subsequently extended the closing
date until September 15, 1991.
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8. MOHSA played an intermediary role between the hospitals and equipment suppliers in
two ways: (i) the Medical Devices Division (MDD)2 ensured that hospital equipment requests,
once approved by the ESC, were sent to the Office of Supply, Republic of Korea (OSROK) and
processed; and (ii) the Medical Management Division (MMD)3 checked the financial status of the
applying hospitals, and arranged sub-loan agreements, including the collateral and repayment
schedules of individual hospitals. These arrangements worked smoothly, with full cooperation
from all parties.
9. As required, MOHSA submitted semi-annual progress reports to the Bank, and status
reports were presented to visiting missions. The performances of the independent review panels for
selecting hospitals and equipment were satisfactory, with criteria and guidelines for selection being
followed.
10. The project succeeded in procuring and distributing biomedical equipment o a total of 81
hospitals. A sample of bid evaluation reports at OSROK was evaluated during supervision
missions and no irregularities found in awarding contracts.
11. Initially, however, implementation was somewhat slow, and disbursements well behind
schedule (see Table 9). Various factors were involved:
(a) MOHSA staff working on this project had no previous experience with Bank
projects. While some of the familiarization with Bank procedures had been
accomplished uring preparation, this still affected initial implementation, and was
compounded by language barriers;4
(b) Some hospitals did not meet project requirements, or were unable to fulfill security
submission requirements. Their removal slowed implementation, but showed that
HSC was able to mitigate project risk by their removal;
(c) There were some difficulties in getting enough hospitals for component C. Some
hospitals also partially withdrew by asking for a smaller loan, which increased the
unallocated portion of the loan when well into the implementation period;
(d) To some extent, demand from private hospitals was lowered by the growing
market for leasing medical equipment.
12. Factors (b) - (d) were beyond the control of MOHSA, given the demand-driven ature of
the project. They were dealt with in a flexible manner, however, by both the Bank and the
Borrower. Without sufficient demand in component C, some hospitals were instead chosen from a
waiting list and some of loan proceeds allocated to components A and B. The Bank agreed that
Guidelines for Allocation of Loan Proceeds between components, as stated in the SAR, were
adjusted accordingly. Table 5 shows actual disbursements. The substitution of hospitals was a
key factor allowing later progress to be described as "significant and satisfactory".
2 Until April 1994, called the Logistics Management Division (LMID).
3 Until April 1994, called the Hospital Management Division (HAD).
4 The experience with this project later minimized the start-up costs of the Public Hospital Modernization
Project.
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13. Tables 5, 6A, and 6B provide information on actual costs compared to appraisal estimates.
In two cases under components B and C, the ceilings on individual hospital were exceeded, by
$300,000, with the concurrence of the Bank. It also should be noted that both the SAR and actual
figures under "transportation, operations, and consumables", financed by beneficiary hospitals, are
estimates. Hospitals were not required to inform MOHSA of the exact cost of their complementary
inputs, and so data are not available.
14. The only part of the project not implemented was training5 . However the resources
allocated to this component (US$6,126) were so insignificant hat project outcome was not
affected. MOHSA staff received assistance during project preparation (para. 16), and through
advice from supervision missions. No training was given to hospital representatives; however,
hospital operations appeared sufficiently sophisticated to make training unnecessary, nor did its
omission appear to affect project implementation egatively.
15. Approximately 4.9 percent of the loan (US$2.95 million) was cancelled. This is a very
small percentage, given: (a) the difficulties of forecasting the exact amount of on-lending to
individual hospitals in a demand-driven project, and (b) procurement by OSROK under ICB
procedures resulted in cost savings estimated at about 10%, hence reducing the estimated initial
cost to each individual hospital. In addition, the unexpected growth of the equipment leasing
market, linked to Korea's rapid economic growth, was another factor which reduced hospital
demand for loans. MOHSA's actions to reallocate available funds were commendable, and key to
keeping total disbursements close to the $60 million loan amount.
C. Bank Performance
16. During preparation, missions spent significant amounts of time to help familiarize their
Korean counterparts in Bank procedures. A training session was organized for the MOHSA
technical team, in which the procedures for procurement and disbursement, financial matters
(audits, SOEs), data collection, and monitoring and evaluation were explained and reviewed. A
financial analyst assisted with the onlending feature of the project.
17. Supervision missions began 3 months after signing, and took place twice a year. A total of
8 staff weeks was spent on supervision, of which 5 were in the field (Tables 8 and 9). While
supervision resources were less than those written into the SAR,6 they were adequate for
monitoring implementation progress and solving problems. For example, when implementation
was behind schedule, supervision missions provided assistance on a more flexible use of various
disbursement and procurement procedures. A detailed list of actions was proposed to overcome
delays and allow close to full commitment of the loan, ensuring that both MOHSA and OSROK
appreciated the need for special actions. However, staff weeks allocated for supervision were
insufficient o allow site visits to hospitals, which were not undertaken until the final completion
mission.
5 "Seminars on loan management and domestic procurement would be conducted by KHA in conjunction with
MOHSA for representatives of the selected hospitals in 1991... seminars for equipment managers ...on the
subjects of domestic procurement issues such as transportation, insurance, customs clearance and surveyors
clearance" (SAR, p. 14).
6 The SAR stated that "supervision would be carried out by the Task Manager (Public Health Specialist)
accompanied once a year by a biomedical equipment specialist and once a year by a procurement specialist".
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D. Borrower Performance
18. The project was well prepared by a MOHSA Task Force, and working relations were
described as excellent. MOHSA staff fully cooperated with Bank staff, provided all assistance
requested of them, and were very responsive to Bank advice. Background information and required
drafts of selection criteria and sub-loan agreements were provided on time. A Project
Implementation Unit was established, as well as a Hospital Selection Committee and an Equipment
Selection Committee.
19. MOHSA tried to maximize utilization of loan proceeds by proceeding rapidly with
selection of private hospitals. MOHSA made efforts to minimize the time taken by procurement
procedures by informing newly selected hospitals to prepare equipment lists even before sub-loan
agreement signing, and by sending procurement requests to OSROK more quickly. OSROK staff
cooperated fully in extending assistance to MOHSA to help achieve the objective of full utilization
of loan proceeds.
E. Achievement of Project Objectives
20. The project achieved its stated objectives: (a) it supported the regional distribution of
medical technologies in the eight medical regions; (b) it was successful in procuring and
distributing equipment o 81 hospitals maintaining a geographical balance according to regional
population density; (c) equipment was selected using an Equipment Selection Committee and was
purchased through the central OSROK yielding better prices; and (d) it contributed to institutional
strengthening of the Medical Management Division (MMD) in equipment identification,
prioritization and procurement, and the Medical Devices Division (MDD) in reviewing the
financial status of project hospitals..
21. Available data show a fairly wide regional distribution of project benefits (Tables
10A/B/C), particularly true of Components B and C. Visits to two hospitals during the completion
mission also provided evidence of the high equipment utilization rates. Hospital administrators
expressed great satisfaction with the equipment.
22. The objective of institutional strengthening of MOHSA was achieved. The divisions
responsible for implementing the project (MMD and MDD) were effective and efficient
(paras.18, 19).
23. Policy dialogue was not one of the four formal objectives recorded in the loan agreement,
but was mentioned in the SAR as an important goal.' While this goal was not operationalized
through project design, for example through the inclusion of studies, the project prepared the way
for the Public Hospital Modernization Project (Ln. 3516-KO, June 1992) in which broader sector
issues are addressed and a number of detailed research studies are underway.8
7 Financing issues were particularly relevant since all of the procedures using project equipment were supposed
to be reimbursable under Korea's medical insurance system, participation in which became mandatory for all
citizens from July 1, 1989.
8 Four studies focus on: econometric modelling of optimal distribution of medical resources; national health
expenditures; alternatives to the fee-for-service method; and impact of National Health Insurance on
Government policy objectives of equity, cost and quality.
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F. Project Sustainability
24. Sustainability is an issue for both the private hospitals which borrowed under the project,
and for MOHSA. Sustainability for the hospitals is highly likely. There is adequate and timely
availability of spare parts and maintenance for hospitals to keep the new equipment functioning.
All of the procedures using the equipment are reimbursable under the national health insurance. So
far, the foreign exchange risk to hospitals of holding dollar-denominated loans is minimal.
However, it should be noted that a prior OECF project had lent to private hospitals in yen, which
later caused hardship when the yen appreciated significantly against the won.
25. The main risk to MOHSA identified in the project is that of default by hospitals on their
sub-loan agreements. With sub-loan agreements including 5 years grace on repayrnent of principal
and a 10 year repayment period, the importance of this factor will only be ascertained over time.
However, a number of project design elements mitigate this risk:
(a) MMD required financial statements demonstrating funancial soundness of
applicant hospitals, which would have deterred more risky hospitals from
applying;
(b) hospitals were required to mortgage their assets to MOHSA, as collateral for their
loans; and
(c) MMD will continue to regularly monitor project hospitals, requiring them to
provide yearly financial statements, which would alert MMD to any impending
problems.
26. Moreover, interest payments from hospitals became due as soon as loans were effective.
MMD reported that all due interest payments had been made on time.
27. A wider sustainability issue relates to the increasing medical insurance payments which in
part are generated by new medical technologies.9 Since project hospitals were only a small part of
the total non-profit private hospitals (see Tables 10A/B/C), the incremental impact would be
marginal. The various studies financed under the Public Hospital Modernization Project will
clarify policy options on some of these issues.
G. Assessment of Outcome
28. Project outcome can be considered satisfactory. Hospitals appear to be satisfied with the
equipment purchased, and with MOHSA handling of sub-loans and procurement hrough OSROK.
The SAR stressed the objective of equitable access to quality medical care. This was partly built
into project design: the risk that mainly affluent Koreans would benefit from improved technology
was mitigated by excluding 5 highly sophisticated equipment items, used for procedures that were
not reimbursable through national medical insurance. The equipment selection criteria also tried to
build in regional distribution among the 8 medical regions. However, equity issues, in terms of
9 Medical insurance payments as a percentage of the MOHSA budget increased from 12.5% in 1983 to 37% in
1990.
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reaching the poor, were more directly addressed in the Public Hospital Modernization Project,
which followed in June 1992. 1°
29. It is not clear to what extent project funds substituted for funds already available from
domestic capital markets. A premise of the SAR was that " bankers.. .are reluctant to lend to
hospitals...hospitals located in less favorable socioeconomic areas and in smaller cities and towns
are more capital-constrained" (p.9). However, application for project financing was no greater
among hospitals outside Seoul than from those within (Tables 1 OA/B/C) The two hospitals visited
in Seoul had easy and frequent access to bank funding. The most likely conclusion is that project
funds presented an alternative source of finance for hospitals, which had various advantages and
disadvantages when compared to bank financing (para.28). Also, the justification in providing
long-term loans where the market would lend only short- to medium-term is less compelling in
practice, since short-term borrowing could also be used to finance leased equipment. It is also
likely that the sophistication of private hospitals had already superseded the need for the project to
help in "setting an example for improved financial management of hospitals in the private sector". "
H. Summary of Findings, Future Operations, and Key Lessons Learned
30. Project implementation was satisfactory, and its achievements appear sustainable. The
project was innovative in that it involved MOHSA on-lending to private hospitals at a non-
subsidized rate, and that a negative list of equipment to some extent responded to equity concerns.
31. The project was largely an equipment procurement operation, with institutional
strengthening of MMD and MDD. The project achieved its stated objectives: (a) it supported the
regional distribution of medical technologies in the eight medical regions; (b) the project was
successful in procuring and distributing equipment to 81 hospitals maintaining a geographical
balance according to regional population density; and (c) equipment was selected using an
Equipment Selection Conmmittee and was purchased through the central OSROK yielding better
prices. In addition, the project opened the way for a successor project which addressed health
sector policy issues in health care financing and cost containment.
32. The private hospital sector in Korea five years later and six years after implementation of
National Health Insurance appears sufficiently developed to access capital markets such that a
similar lending operation would now affect it in only a marginal way. However, the on-lending
approach may be replicable in other countries.
10 The SAR for the latter project notes that "the poor have traditionally sought medical care at public facilities,
and continue to do so out of habit, and because private hospitals have no financial incentives for serving the
poor". About 7.5% of the population, some 3.2 million people, are classified as poor or medically indigent and
are not covered by National Health Insurance. The distribution of the ten public hospitals chosen in this project
is much different than the distribution in the Health Technology Project; notably, no loans go to the medical
regions containing Seoul and Pusan.
l Included in the formal objectives of the SAR (no. (iv)). It was argued that this would overcome the lack of
transparency of foundations, which in turn reduced their access to financial markets.
7
33. The project had a straightforward design and was implemented satisfactorily. Thus there
are no major lessons to be learned. However, several observations are pertinent:
(a) The procurement of equipment under ICB procedures by an efficient procurement
agency (OSROK) resulted in savings of about 10% in total equipment costs.
(b) The training component, while small, was not implemented. This did not affect
the outcome of the project but greater effort should have been made to ensure that
the component was actually implemented.
(c) Lending to hospitals, rather than grant financing or outright donation of
equipment, carries with it a greater incentive for hospitals to ensure proper
maintenance of equipment.
8
Table 1: Summary of Assessments
A. Achievement of obiectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicable
Macro policies x
Sector policies x
Financial objectives x
Institutional development x
Physical objectives x
Poverty reduction x
Gender issues x
Other social objectives x
Environmental objectives x
Public sector development x
Other - Private sector x
development
B. Proiect sustainabilitv Lielj Unlikely Uncertain
x
Highl-Y
C. Bank performance Satisfactory Satisfactorv Deficient
Identification x
Preparation assistance x
Appraisal x
Supervision x
D. Borrower performance Satisfactorv Satisfactorv Deficient
Preparation X
Implementation x
Covenant compliance x
Operation (if applicable) x
HighlY Hiv
E. Assessment of outcome satisfactorv Satisatisfavtory tisfactory unsatisfactory
x
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Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits
Loan/credit title Purpose Year of Status
approval
Preceding operations
Population Project Reduce fertility and infant and 1979 Closed Dec. 31,
(Ln. 1774-5-KO) maternal mortality, particularly in 1987. Fully
rural areas. disbursed.
Following operations
Public Hospital Improve quality of medical care in 1992 Ongoing
Modernization Project public hospitals; increase access of
(Ln. 35160-KO) poor; training.
Table 3: Project Timetable
Date actual/latest
Steps in project cycle Date planned estimate
Identification (Executive Project Sununary) 1/29/90
Preparation 02/90 02/90 - 10/90
Appraisal 10/90- 11/90 12/90
Negotiations 01/91 - 02/91 04/91
Board presentation 05/23/91 5/23/91
Signing 07/91 7/19/91
Effectiveness 10/91 10/16/91
Project Completion 06/30/94 06/30/94
Loan closing 12/31/94 12/31/94
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Table 4: Loan/Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual
(US$ thousands)
FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95
Appraisal estimate 6.5 27.5 57.0 60.0
Actual 6.0 13.5 45.3 57.0
Actualas%ofestimate 92.3% 49.1% 79.5% 95%
Date of final disbursement 4/20/95
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Table 5: Key Implementation Indicators
Key Implementation Indicators Estimated Actual
Component A -- NCD
Hospital selection - number of sub-loans signed 15-30 13
as % of eligible (85): 15%
Equipment procurement:
Component otal $20 M $18.7 M
Ceiling for individual hospital $1.5 M $1.2 M - 1.47 M
Transportation, operations and consumables ( $4.2 M $4.2 M
Component B -- NPP
Hospital selection - number of sub-loans signed 20-30 40
as % of eligible (206): 19%
Equipment procurement:
Component otal $20 M $25.6 M
Ceiling for individual hospital $1.0 M $220,000 - $1.3 M ( 
Transportation, operations and consumables ( $4.2 M $4.2 M
Component C -- EMS
Hospital selection - number of sub-loans signed 20-30 28
as % of eligible (79): 35%
Equipment procurement:
Component otal $20 M $12.7 M
Ceiling for individual hospital $1.0 M $110,000 - $1.3 M ( )
Transportation, operations and consumables ( $4.2 M $4.2 M
Training
Hospital Representatives Training 50 persons none
Financing and/or Equipment Manager Training 50 persons none
t) I should be noted that both the SAR and actual figures under "transportation, operations, and
consumables", financed by beneficiary hospitals, are estimates. Hospitals were not required to inform
MOHSA of the exact cost of their complementary inputs, and so data are not available.
) One hospital was above the loan ceiling. Its initial allocation of $700,000 was later increased to $1.3
million.
) One hospital was above the loan ceiling. Its initial allocation of $1 million was later increased to $1.3
million.
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Table 6A: Project Costs
Appraisal estimate (US$ Million) Actual/latest estimate
(costs including contingencies) (US$Million)
Local Foreign Local Foreign
costs costs Total costs costs Total
Item
Equipment - 67.1 67.1 - 57.0 57.0
Transportation and installation 3.7 0.3 4.0 3.7 0.3 4.0
Operation, maintenance and 4.3 0.4 4.7 4.3 0.4 4.7
training I
Consumable materials 4.9 0.5 5.4 4.9 0.5 5.4
Total Project Costs 12.9 68.3 81.2 12.9 58.2 71.1
Note: both the SAR and actual figures under "transportation, operations, and consumables", financed by beneficiary hospitals, are
estimates. Hospitals were not required to inform MOHSA of the exact cost of their complementary inputs, and so data are not
available.
Table 6B: Project Financing
Appraisal estimate Actual/latest estimate
(US$M) (US$M)
Local Foreign Local Foreign
Source costs costs Total costs costs Total
IBRD - 60.0 60.0 - 57.0 57.0
Domestic contribution 13.0 8.2 21.2 12.9 1.2 14.1
(private hospitals) I I
TOTAL 13.0 68.2 81.2 12.9 58.2 71.1
Note: both the SAR and actual figures under "transportation, operations, and consumables", financed by beneficiary hospitals, are
estimates. Hospitals were not required to inform MOHSA of the exact cost of their complementary inputs, and so data are not
available.
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Table 7: Status of Legal Covenants
Korea
Health Technology Project
Agreement Section Covenant Status Original Revised Description Comments
type Fulfillment Fulfillment of
date date Covenant
Loan 3330-KO 3.01(b) M OK - - Cary out the Fulfilled
project in
accordance with the
Implementation
Program in
Schedule 5
4.01 F OK 06/30/91 - Furnish to the Bank No Expenditure
audit report in CY 1991
contaiuing a
06/30/93 separate opinion on No Expenditure
SOEs not later than in CY 1992
June 30 of each year
06/30/94 Received 7/20/94
Table 8: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs
Planned Revised Actual
Stage of Weeks US$000 Weeks US$000 Weeks US$000
project cycle
Through appraisal 15.0 8.3 45.0 33.1 46.0 0.0
Appraisal-Board 29.0 18.1 14.0 1.6 11.4 0.0
Supervision 19.0 26.1 17.0 22.6 8.0 3.3
Completion (M) 10.0 42.2 9.5 34.8 3.7 10.4
TOTAL 73.0 94.7 85.5 92.1 69.1 13.7
"* Note: Dollar costs for completion appear high because they include the salary and benefit costs of staff involved in the
project. This change in cost calculations was made July 1, 1994.
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Table 9: Bank Resources: Missions
Stage of Month/year Number Days in Specialized Performance Rating Types of problems
project cycle of field staff skills
persons represented Implemen- Development
tation objectives status
Through 12/89 2 6 HPE
appraisal PRO
2/90 - 3/90 4 19 HPE - -
PRO
FNA
EGR
7/90 2 5 HPE-
PRO
9/90 3 17 HPE
PRO
FNA
Appraisal 12/90 1 4 IHPE
through Board
approval
Supervision 11/91 1 3 PRO I I disbursement lag 100%
5/92 - 6/92 1 4 PRO I I disbursement lag 5%
proj. mgmt. perf. = 2
procurement perf. = 2
11/92 1 4 PRO I 1 disbursement lag 64%
financial perf. = 2
5/93 1 4 PRO I I disbursement lag 51%
financial perf. = 2
11/93 1 4 PRO 1 1
5/94 1 4 PRO I I disbursement lag 17%
Completion 12/94 2 4 PRO HS HS
ECN
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Table IOA
Regional Distribution of Project Activities
Component A: Non-communicable Disease Units
Total hospitals Eligible Hospitals Project Hospitals
Medical Population
Region City Weight (%) Number % of total Number % of total Number % of total
Kyung In Seoul 25.1 182 26.4 34 29.8 5 38.5
(43.3 %) Kyung Ki 13.1 83 12.1 12 10.5 1 7.7
Inchon 3.9 20 2.9 7 6.1
Cheju 1.2 7 1.0 1 0.9
Kyung Nam Pusan 9.0 73 10.6 12 10.5 2 15.4
(17.5 %) Kyung Nam 8.5 63 9.2 10 8.9
Kyung Buk Kyung Buk 6.6 42 6.1 10 8.9 2 15.4
(11.8 %) Daeku 5.2 31 4.5 5 4.4
Chon Nam Chon Nam 5.8 42 6.1 2 1.7
(8.6 %) Kwangju 2.8 29 4.2 4 3.5
Chung Nam Chung Nam 4.5 25 3.6 3 2.6 1 7.6
(7.0 %) Daejeion 2.5 18 2.6 3 2.6
Chon Buk Chon Buk 4.9 23 3.3 3 2.6
(4.9 %) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Kang Won Kang Won 3.8 29 4.2 5 4.4 2 15.4
(3.8 %) _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _
Chung Buk Chung Buk 3.1 22 3.2 3 2.6
(3.1 %)
Total 100.0 689 100.0 114 100.0 13 100.0
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Table IOB
Regional Distribution of Project Activities
Component B: Secondary Care Hospitals
Total hospitals Eligible Hospitals Project Hospitals
Medical Population
Region City Weight (%) Number % of total Number % of total Number % of total
Kyung In Seoul 25.1 182 26.4 36 21.7 11 27.5
(43.3 %) Kyung Ki 13.1 83 12.1 21 12.7 2 5.0
Inchon 3.9 20 2.9 6 3.6 1 2.5
Cheju 1.2 7 1.0 2 1.2
Kyung Nam Pusan 9.0 73 10.6 24 14.5 5 12.5
(17.5 %) Kyung Nam 8.5 63 9.2 19 11.4 6 15.0
Kyung Buk Kyung Buk 6.6 42 6.1 8 4.8 3 7.5
(11.8 %) Daeku 5.2 31 4.5 8 4.8
Chon Nam Chon Nam 5.8 42 6.1 15 9.0 3 7.5
(8.6 %) Kwangju 2.8 29 4.2 2 1.2
Chung Nam Chung Nam 4.5 25 3.6 4 2.4
(7.0 %) Daejeion 2.5 18 2.6 3 1.8 2 5.0
Chon Buk Chon Buk 4.9 23 3.3 4 2.4 3 7.5
(4.9 %) _ _ _ __ _ _
Kang Won Kang Won 3.8 29 4.2 7 4.2 3 7.5
(3.8%)
Chung Buk Chung Buk 3.1 22 3.2 7 4.2 1 2.5
(3.1 %)
Total 100.0 689 100.0 166 100.0 40 100.0
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Table 10C
Regional Distribution of Project Activities
Component C: Emergency Medical Services
Total hospitals Eligible Hospitals Project Hospitals
Medical Population
Region City Weight (%) Number % of total Number % of total Number % of total
Kyung In Seoul 25.1 182 26.4 52 21.3 7 25.0
(43.3 %) Kyung Ki 13.1 83 12.1 26 10.7 3 10.7
Inchon 3.9 20 2.9 11 4.5 1 3.5
Cheju 1.2 7 1.0 4 1.6
Kyung Nam Pusan 9.0 73 10.6 19 7.8 1 3.5
(17.5 %) Kyung Nam 8.5 63 9.2 18 7.4 2 7.2
Kyung Buk Kyung Buk 6.6 42 6.1 19 7.8 3 10.7
(11.8 %) Daeku 5.2 31 4.5 10 4.1 1 3.5
Chon Nam Chon Nam 5.8 42 6.1 20 8.2 2 7.2
(8.6 %) Kwangju 2.8 29 4.2 6 2.5 2 7.2
Chung Nam Chung Nam 4.5 25 3.6 13 5.3 1 3.6
(7.0 %) Daejeion 2.5 18 2.6 7 2.9
Chon Buk Chon Buk 4.9 23 3.3 12 4.9 1 3.6
(4.9 %) _ _ _ _
Kang Won Kang Won 3.8 29 4.2 16 6.6 1 3.6
(3.8%)
Chung Buk Chung Buk 3.1 22 3.2 11 4.5 3 10.7
(3.1 %)
Total 100.0 689 100.0 244 100.0 28 100.0
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REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Health Technology Project under Loan 3330-KO
Public Hospital Modernization Project under Loan 3516-KO
IBRD Progress Review Mission
Nov. 14- Dec. 10. 1994
AIDE MEMOIREI
1. An IBRD Mission2 visited Korea during Nov. 14 - Dec. 10, 1994 to review
implementation progress of nine projects. This Aide Memoire deals only with Loans
3330-KO and 3516-KO under the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MOHSA).
2. The mission visited the Treasury Division, Treasury Bureau, Ministry of Finance
(MOF); the Medical Affairs Bureau (MAB) of MOHSA; the Medical Management
Division (MMD), MAB, MOHSA; two private hospitals and Division m, Foreign
Procurement Bureau, Office of Supply, Republic of Korea (OSROK). The staff of the
Medical Devices Division, MAB, MOHSA joined the visit to OSROK. The mission
wishes to record its thanks to all the officials met and for their kind assistance and
generous hospitality.
3. Progress of implementation of both projects is satisfactory. Procurement and
disbursements have improved. Bid evaluation reports were sample checked at OSROK
and there were no irregularities. Statement of Expenditures (SOEs) and supporting
vouchers were also sample checked at MOHSA, also with no irregularities. Both Loan
Agreements are in full compliance, including timely submission of audit reports.
Health Technology Project under Loan 3330-KO.
4. MOHSA has completed the task of allocating all the loan proceeds (US$60
million) to 81 hospitals with full compliance to the Loan Agreement dated July 19, 1991
and the Staff Appraisal Report No. 9280-KO dated April 24, 1991. Procurement of
I The views expressed in this Aide Memoire are subject o the review of IBRD management.
2 The mission comprised Mr. Willy De Geyndt, Principal Health Specialist, Sing Zak Sung,
Consultant and Ms. Susan Szabo, Econornist.
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equipment would reach about $57.4 million by the present Closing Date, Dec. 31, 1994.
MOHSA plans to let the unused loan fund of about $2.6 million be cancelled.
5. The mission pointed out that in Annex I to the last Aide Memoire dated May 21,
1994, MOHSA has been advised that MOHSA can still use procurement procedures other
than ICB, such as the "Shopping" procedure between now and the Closing Date to make
more purchases and thus reduce the amount of loan fund cancellation. MOHSA staff
pointed out that it would be difficult to implement it with only one month left before the
Closing Date.
6. Disbursements could continue to April 30, 1995, four months after the Closing
Date, if the Bank would grant for this purpose, a 4-month grace period. The mission
would recommend to the Bank to grant this 4-month grace period for miscellaneous
eligible expenditure disbursements. The mission also pointed out to MOHSA that while
the residual amount of funds in the Special Account may have been too small (due to
Bank's recovery of funds from Special Accounts towards the time of Closing Dates) for
payments of equipment contracts, be they awarded through ICB procedure or other
procurement procedures, MOHSA can still use Forn 1903 for direct payment to suppliers
and solve the lack of funds problem in the Special Account. A direct payment Form 1903
sample was presented to MOHSA.
7. Implementation Completion Report (ICR) was discussed, and MOHSA was
referred to para 7 of the last Aide Memoire dated May 21, 1994 and Annex 2 of the Aide
Memoire dated November 25, 1993 on Bank's requirements. The mission requested
MOHSA to send its own evaluation report on Loan 3330-KO to the Bank before March
31, 1995. Ms. S. Szabo, IBRD staff, joined the mission for five days between November
28 and December 3, 1994 for ICR work under separate terms of reference. Her activities
included, among others, checking on achieving project development objectives. The
information gathered will be used to prepare the Bank's part of the ICR, a draft of which
will be sent to MOHSA in January 1995 for comments.
Public Hospital Modernization Project under Loan 3516-KO
8. The mission noted with pleasure that further significant progress has been made
since last mission in May, 1994. Requests for equipment procurement sent to OSROK
have reached 100% of the amount of loan proceeds for this project; contracts awarded
have exceeded 50%, and disbursements have exceeded one third.
9. The implementation plan for the next two years before the Closing Date of the
Loan is also satisfactory. It is expected that procurement for the $30 million planned in
total would be achieved; disbursements would reach about $30 million; and cancellation of
loan amounts unused, if any, would be insignificant. There is no need for an extension of
the Closing Date.
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10. The mission reviewed the progress of the four health policy research studies being
carried out by the Korea Institute of Health and Social Affairs, the Korea Institute of
Health Services Management, and the School of Public Health at Seoul National
University. Progress is satisfactory and results of one of the studies (National Health
Expenditures) are already available in published form in English and Korean. Results of
the other three studies would be available in 1995. The mission recommended to MOHSA
that steps be taken towards establishing a formal system of national health accounts with
regular and systematic collection of data on national health expenditures. The mission
noted that health care reform is part of the present political agenda with initiatives to
improve the efficiency, quality and equity of the Korean health care delivery system.
Cleared with and cc: b
Mr. Willy De Geyndt, Task Manager Sing Zak Sung
for these two projects Consultant, IBRD
December 5, 1994
cc List
Ministry of Finance Fax No.: 82-2-503-9324
Mr. Ahn, Taek-Soon
Deputy Director, Treasury Division
Treasury Bureau
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs Fax No.: 82-2-503-7568
Mr. Cho, Byung-Ryun
Director General
Medical Affairs Bureau
Mr. Byun, Chul-Shik
Director
Medical Management Division
Office of Supply, Republic of Korea Fax No.: 82-2-533-9158
Mr. Lee, Joon-Tak, Director
Division 3, Foreign Procurement Bureau
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Te I: (02)503-7524, 500-3020
Fax: (02)503-7568, 504-6418
Seoul, Korea
Mr. J. Shivakumar 427-760
Chief
Population and Human Resources Division
East Asia and Pacific Region June 9, 1995
The World Bank
1818 H. Street, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20433, U.S.A.
Dear Mr. J. Shivakumar
Re : ICR on Loan 3330 - KO
It is my pleasure to forward the comments and evaluation on the Implementation
Completion Report for the IBRD Health Technology Project (3330 - KO) as attached.
Thank you for your continued cooporation.
Sincerely yours,
Rhie, Dong Mo, M.D., Ph.D
Director General
Medical Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Health and Welfare
Republic of Korea
Encl As stated
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Coments andEvaluation on The Implementation Completion Rep rt (Loan 3330-KO)
Prior to making my comments on the Implementation Completion Report(ICR),
I would like to take this opportunity to thank staff of IBRD who put their best
efforts in implementing of the Health Technology Project (IBRD 3330-KO).
The Comments and Evaluation on the ICR are as follows:
Firstly, I perfectly agree with the ICR which IBRD has prepared. It describes
the whole implementation process for this project very precisely and analytically.
Secondly, it should be noted that this project was well developed by focusing on
equity and efficiency which the Korean government has regarded as very important
factors in terms of Korean medical services provision. In particular, the objectives
of this project were set up on the basis of equity on medical resource distri-
bution among eight medical regions. Also, as the whole procurement process
was centralized in the Office of Supply, Republic of Korea, and Korea Exchange
Bank, the efficiency was always achieved. Even though MOH W Staff participated
in this project did not have any experience with IBRD Project) there were
no difficulties in the procurement for biomedical equipment.
Thirdly, regarding the medical environment in Korea, medical services are mostly
provided by private nonprofit hospitals as mentioned in ICR. However, it was
not easy for the nonprofit hospitals to access bank loans with good conditions
like the IBRD Loan. Therefore, most of the selected hospitals appreciated the loan.
Moreover, considering the financial status of the selected hospitals for this
project, it will be no problem to amortize the principle and interest of the loan.
This is because of the strict criteria used to select hospitals according to the
loan agreement. It means that this project has been carried out under the
strict management of the Korean government. In addition, it was good sense to
adopt a negative equipment list for procurement to prevent increasing National
Health Expenditure. 23
In conclusion, this project outcome is satisfa Qr d its achievement
sustainable. All equipment procured by this project installed and is
working in good conditions. We evaluate that the objectives of this project have
been achieved. Also, the lessons learned from this project will be utilized
for the implementation of IBRD 3516-KO project.
Finally, some correction for figures in ICR should be made.
On page iii, 4.9 percent is correct instead of 4.4 percent because US$ 2.9
million was cancelled in this project. On page 13, Table 6A, Actual/latest
estima'te for Equipment should be 57.0 instead of 57.4. In addition, Table 6A,
Actual/latest estimate from IBRD should be 57.0 instead of 57.4.
Rhie, Dong Mo M.D.,Ph.D.
Director General
Medical Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Health and Welfare
Republic of Korea
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